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Case No. 20120147-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

IRENE GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distribution of or arranging
to distribute a controlled substance, a first degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010). This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009) (pour-over provision).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In December 2010, Irene Garcia approached an undercover narcotics
detective in Pioneer Park, and asked "How much do you need?" or "How
much do you want?" or "What are you looking for?" When the detective
told her "forty white" - drug jargon for $40 worth of cocaine - Garcia turned
to an Hispanic man standing nearby, called "forty" in Spanish, and waved

him over. While Garcia watched, the man came over, took $40 from the
detective, and spit out two twists of cocaine.
1. Was the evidence sufficient to show that Defendant intentionally
or knowingly agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a
controlled substance?
Standard of Review. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court reviews "the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury/' State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). A jury conviction will be reversed
only when the evidence, viewed in that light, "is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE1
A. Summary of facts.
On the morning of December 9, 2010, Irene Garcia left home, telling
her niece that she was going to the Wiggam Center in downtown Salt Lake
City, but that she would return shortly so that they could go Christmas
shopping. '£.191:189,190,193.
About an hour later, Garcia approached undercover narcotics
detective Christopher Johnson, who was working in Pioneer Park, a wellknown drug-trafficking area. R.191.141, 143, 162. Garcia asked Detective
Johnson, "How much do you want?" or "How much do you need?" or
"What are you looking for?"2

R.191:143, 165.

Detective Johnson,

understanding Garcia's inquiry to refer to drugs, told her "forty white,"
which, in drug parlance, means $40 worth of cocaine. R. 191:143, 166.
Garcia then turned to an Hispanic man standing nearby, called "cuarenta,"
meaning forty in Spanish, and gestured for the man to approach. R. 191:1431

Consistent with well-established appellate standards, the facts are
recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Brown, 948 P.2d at
343.
2

At trial, Detective Johnson could not remember Garcia's exact
words, but testified that based on his experience working undercover in
Pioneer Park, he understood her to be asking him if he wanted to purchase
drugs. R.191143,165-166.

(

144.

The man immediately approached Detective Johnson and Garcia.

R.191144,168-169. After Detective Johnson showed him two twenty dollar
bills, the man spit out two twists of cocaine and handed them to the
detective. R.191:144,170. During this transaction, Garcia remained nearby,
straddling her bicycle.

R.191:169.

As soon as the transaction was

completed, Garcia, Detective Johnson, and the Hispanic man immediately
parted, leaving the park in different directions. R.191:171. A short time
later, police separately arrested the man and Garcia a short distance from
the park. R.191:173.
Garcia did not testify at trial.

Her only witness was her niece,

Cynthia, who testified that Garcia had left home on the morning of
December 9, 2010, ostensibly to go to the Wiggam Center, which is a short
distance from Pioneer Park. R.191:190.
B. Summary of proceedings.
Garcia was charged with distributing or arranging to distribute a
controlled substance in a public park, a first degree felony, R.001-003, A
jury found Garcia guilty. R.164. On January 27, 2012, she was sentenced to
a suspended sentence of five years to life in prison, and put on supervised

probation for 36 months. R.175, 176. She timely appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court. R.178-179,190.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Garcia claims the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to establish
she knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a controlled
substance. Aplt. Brf. at 13. She argues that the State "failed to prove that
[she] understood '40 white' to mean cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic
male dealt cocaine/' Id. at 17. Garcia asserts that "the evidence suggests
that [she] had no relationship with the Hispanic male, and [that she] was
merely solicited to translate for unknown individuals while traveling
through the park to the Wiggam Center." Id. at 14. In other words, Garcia
claims that the evidence shows that she was an innocent bystander or a
victim of circumstances rather than - as the jury found - that she knowingly
assisted a drug deal with an undercover officer. Id. at 14-15.
In fact, the evidence presented at trial and its reasonable inference
was more than sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Garcia
was guilty of arranging to distribute a controlled substance.

Garcia

approached the detective; she asked what he wanted; she signaled the drug
dealer by saying "cuarenta" and beckoning to him; the Hispanic male

responded to her beckoning, took $40, and gave the detective the exact
amount and type of drug he had requested while Garcia watched; and
when the deal was completed, they all immediately left the park. When
taken together, the evidence is sufficient to support the reasonable inference
that Garcia knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a
controlled substance.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE AT TRIAL
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANTS
CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Garcia claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction for distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance because it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she
knowingly and intentionally participated in the transaction. Aplt. Brf. at 1314. She argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient toreasonably infer that she intended to arrange a drug sale because "the State
failed to prove that [she] understood '40 white' to mean cocaine and that
she knew the Hispanic male dealt cocaine/' Aplt. Brf. at 17. But the
evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the jury

verdict, was more than sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
Garcia knowingly and intentionally participated in a drug sale.
To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellant must show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted/' State
v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah Ct App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks
omitted).
Utah law prohibits "distributing] a controlled . . . substance, or . . .
agreefing], consenting], offering], or arrang[ing] to distribute a controlled .
.. substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii).
To establish that a defendant is guilty of distributing or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, the State must "show that an offer,
agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute controlled substances was
made by the defendant and . . . that the behavior was 'engaged in
knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or would be likely
to, occur/" State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 9, 3 R3d 725, abrogated on

other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246. "Any witting or
intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it
takes, is proscribed by the act . . . .

[A]ny act in furtherance of an

arrangement therefor constitutes the criminal offense described by the
statute/' State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923, 924 (Utah 1979).
Garcia suggests that she was an innocent bystander in the park who
was inadvertently caught up in a drug transaction. Aplt. Brf. at 14.

She

claims on appeal that the evidence shows that she was cutting through the
park on her way to the Wiggam Center, and was "solicited to translate for
unknown individuals." Id. In support, she points out that neither she nor
Detective Johnson used the word "cocaine," and she asserts she did not
know what "forty white" meant, but was "only parroting words without
understanding the illicit meaning of '40 white/" Id. She further claims that
she did not have a relationship with the Hispanic man, did not know he
was a drug dealer, and did not intend to summon him specifically. Id. at 1416. She asserts she only gestured in his general direction and could have
been gesturing to anyone standing nearby. Id. at 14.
Garcia's argument views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the defense and not, as the law requires, in the

light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Hodges v. Gibson Products Co,,
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991) (The appellant "must set out in [her] briefs
with record references, all the evidence that support the verdict, including
all valid inferences to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people
would not conclude that the evidence supports the verdict.'').

That is

reason alone to reject Garcia's argument. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, \
16, 989 P.2d 1065 (holding that failure to meet the marshaling burden is
grounds alone for rejecting an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence). In
any event, when the evidence is viewed in its proper light, the evidence was
more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Garcia was no
unwitting bystander, but knowingly assisted in arranging a drug deal with
an undercover officer.
State's evidence, which was uncontroverted, shows that on the
morning of December 9, 2010, Detective Christopher Johnson, an
experienced undercover narcotics detective, was working in Pioneer Park, a
well-known drug-trafficking area. R.191:140-141. Shortly after Detective
Johnson entered the park, Garcia, who was already there, approached him
and asked, "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" or

"What are you looking for?"3 R.191:143,165. In the detective's experience,
Garcia's question was a query as to whether he wanted to purchase drugs.
R.191:166. In response, Detective Johnson told her "forty white," drug
jargon for $40 worth of cocaine.

R.191:143. Garcia then turned to an

Hispanic male standing a short distance away, and called out "cuarenta,"
Spanish for forty, and gestured for the man to come over. R.191:144,167. In
response to her gesture, the man came over and, after Detective Johnson
showed him forty dollars, spit out two twists of cocaine.

R.191:144.

Detective Johnson and the man exchanged the drugs for the money, and
Detective Johnson, the man, and Garcia immediately left the park in
different directions.

R.191:170-171. Garcia and the man were arrested

separately a short distance from the park. R.191:172-173.
Intent or knowledge can be inferred from "conduct and attendant
circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience."

State v.

Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981), overruled in part on other grounds by
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). Garcia's conduct - and the
reasonable inferences drawn from it - unequivocally bespoke her witting
3

It is unclear exactly what Garcia said, but, as explained, Detective
Johnson testified that he understood Garcia to be asking him if he wanted to
purchase drugs. R.191:166.

and intentional aiding in the distribution of drugs.

Garcia directly

approached the detective in a high drug-trafficking area and asked "how
much" he wanted.

R.191:143, 165. Garcia showed neither surprise nor

confusion to the answer of "forty white." Id. Instead, she immediately
called the number and waved to a man who turned out to be a drug dealer.
R.191:143-144.

The drug dealer immediately responded to her signal

R.191:144. Once the man reached the detective, Garcia did not leave, but
remained standing near the pair while the drug transaction transpired. R.
191:169. The man spontaneously provided the exact quantity and type of
drug requested by Detective Johnson. R.191:144. Garcia showed no alarm
or surprise when the man spit out two twists of cocaine and received the
detective's money in return.

Finally, once the drug transaction was

completed, Garcia, the drug dealer, and Detective Johnson all immediately
left the park. R.191:170.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the jury could have reasonably
H

found that Garcia intentionally or knowingly arranged a drug deal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on October 9, 2012.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Aonellee
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Addendum A

o-n A n rv* A

Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2010) Prohibited acts - Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer,
or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37,37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d
that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position
of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a
controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or
IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii)
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first

degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B —Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty
of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall
be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection

(2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively
and not concurrently,
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony,
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in
the person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the
death of another,
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious
bodily injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation
of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same
episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or

issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer,
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other
authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception,
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name,
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact
finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds
of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;

(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section
76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport,
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section
76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4)
would have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not
apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who,
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense,
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection
(4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor

(

mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as
described in Subsection (4) (a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a
plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction,
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance
with the plea in abeyance agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course
of the veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing
the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the
veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or

(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of
the officer's employment.
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1) (v), who uses, possesses, or
transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection
58-37-2(l)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as
defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the
peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion.
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an
affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but
not later than 10 days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense,
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice
for good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the
lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this
Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is
established, it is a complete defense to the charges.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.

